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Summary 
In this paper, we develop a simple model of social dynamics governing the evolution of 
strategic self-protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of 
prospective offenders in a large population with random matching. We prove that 
individual (and socially transmitted) fear of exposure to criminal threats may actually 
condition choices even in the face of objective evidence of declining crime rates, and thereby 
cause the eventual selection of Pareto inefficient equilibria with self-protection. We also 
show that a suitable strategy of provision of public security financed through discriminatory 
taxation of self-protective expenses may actually overcome this problem, and drive the 
social dynamics toward the efficient no protection equilibrium. In our model, we do not 
obtain, as in Cressman et al. (1998), a crowding-out result such that the net impact of 
public spending on the actual social dynamics is neutral and the economy keeps on cycling 
between phases of high and low criminal activity with varying levels of self-protection; quite 
to the contrary, it can be extremely effective in implementing the social optimum, in that it 
acts primarily on the intangible dimension, that is, on the social dynamics of fear. We claim 
that this kind of result calls for more interdisciplinary research on the socio-psycho-
economic determinants of fear of crime, and for consequent advances in modelling 
approaches and techniques. 
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In this paper, we develop a simple model of a social dynamics governing the evolution of strategic self-
protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of prospective offenders in a 
large population with random matching. We prove that individual (and socially transmitted) fear of 
exposure to criminal threats may actually condition choices even in the face of objective evidence of 
declining crime rates, and thereby cause the eventual selection of Pareto inefficient equilibria with self-
protection. We also show that a suitable strategy of provision of public security financed through 
discriminatory taxation of self-protective expenses may actually overcome this problem, and drive the 
social dynamics toward the efficient no protection equilibrium. In our model, we do not obtain, as in 
Cressman et al. (1998), a crowding-out result such that the net impact of public spending on the actual 
social dynamics is neutral and the economy keeps on cycling between phases of high and low criminal 
activity with varying levels of self-protection; quite to the contrary, it can be extremely effective in 
implementing the social optimum, in that it acts primarily on the intangible dimension, that is, on the 
social dynamics of fear. We claim that this kind of result calls for more interdisciplinary research on 
the socio-psycho-economic determinants of fear of crime, and for consequent advances in modelling 
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            "Managing fear is as important as managing the crime itself" 
            Sheldon F. Greenberg, former police officer;  
            cited in Hermann (2009) 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
 
Protection against criminal threats is a classical issue that is likely to be conducive to severe market 
failure, in that it provides a very clear example of interdependent risk (Heal and Kunreuther, 2007). 
For given levels and characteristics of criminal threats, the very fact that I increase my own level of 
self-protection by buying suitable goods or services (a burglar alarm, a watchdog, defensive arms, 
armoured doors and windows, or private security services, to make a few examples) causes a negative 
externality on those who do not act accordingly (for instance, my neighbours who do not have a 
burglar alarm or a watchdog, keep arms at home, mount ordinary doors and windows, and are not 
covered by private surveillance). As a consequence, everybody will be eventually induced to buy 
goods and services to match the others' levels of self-protection, and criminals will increase their 
offensive potential accordingly; such negative externalities may even become a relatively powerful 
engine of growth of the level of economic activity (Antoci and Bartolini, 1999, 2004). Eventually, in 
spite of the money being spent, potential victims will not manage to enhance their (relative) level of 
self-protection, and due to the escalation in offensive and defensive means, the probability of being 
involved in a risky and potentially fatal assault will be increased. Here, interestingly, the welfare loss it 
is not only a problem of (costly, risk-generating) escalation in physical means of offence and defence. 
It is also a problem of escalation in the psychological climate of fear, that can substantially modify people's attitudes toward personal habits and attitudes toward others (Amendola, 1997, 2003). For 
instance,  in  a  neighbourhood  where  an  escalation  of  self-defensive  means  has  occurred  with  the 
consequential changes in terms of the inhabitants' perceptions of fear and hostility toward potential 
offenders, it is more likely that someone could be mistakenly identified and attacked as a potential 
offender  as  a  consequence  of  particular,  unfortunate  circumstances,  even  with  fatal  outcomes. 
Moreover, people will tend to assume a more defensive and fearful attitude toward strangers, being 
exposed more often and more intensively to psychologically stressing and depressing moods, and 
therefore  substantially  worsening  the  possibility  and  quality  of  psychological  flow  processes 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). In particular, this could likely lead people to reshape their leisure time habits 
by substituting relational goods with market goods, in order to cope with the need to increase their 
level of security and control over social relationships, thereby easily leading to the onset of social 
poverty  traps  (Antoci  et  al.,  2007).  Also  the  contradictions  and  ambiguities  in  penal  policies  and 
practice, and thus, among other things, in the provision of public protection against crime and in law 
enforcement, could cast a negative influence in terms of sociability attitudes (O' Malley, 1999). 
The  issue  has  so  far  received  substantial  attention  in  different  disciplinary  fields,  such  as  the 
economics, the sociology and the social psychology of crime and prevention, but the various threads of 
investigation  have  remained  somewhat  separated,  so  that  there  is  a  substantial  lack  of  a  unified 
analytical approach allowing to address it from several, complementary viewpoints. In particular, what 
has been especially lacking is a unified framework allowing to deal at the same time with both the 
physical and psychological aspects of the self-protection escalation dynamics (and consequently with 
their joint welfare implications). This lack of a common framework, in particular, has prevented to 
point out and analyse in a proper way the positive feedback (i.e. self-reinforcing) interaction between 
the two dimensions, and thus has lead to under-estimate the actual social and economic costs of such 
phenomena. In this paper, we propose a simple analytical model that attempts to fix this lacuna by 
rephrasing it within a game-theoretic, evolutionary framework that has already been used in the past to 
tackle similar issues related to the socio-economic dynamics of corruption (Antoci and Sacco, 1995, 
2002). 
In particular, taking as a reference previous work by Cressman et al. (1998), we study a situation of 
randomly matched interaction between criminals and potential victims in a strategically interdependent 
context with random matching, where individual levels of vulnerability to criminal offences depends 
on their own defensive choices, as well as on someone else's (for instance, on their own spatial or 
social 'neighbours' in a given circumstance), and also, of course, on the potential offender's. Protection can be self-provided by individuals, or may be offered as a public, publicly financed service. The 
perception of vulnerability depends on the actual available information on the prevailing social level of 
self-defensive protection (and thus on the actual likelihood of being matched to someone else that has 
a level of protection that is comparable, superior, or inferior to one's own), but also on psychological 
factors that determine one's perceived level of insecurity. In particular, it depends on the actual private 
level of self-defence: The more people actually buy defensive goods or services, the more they face 
evidence  that  there  is  a  safety  problem,  and  the  more  they  reinforce  their  safety-related  fear  and 
distress, thereby becoming relatively more inclined to anti-flow psychological states such as worry or 
anxiety.  People's self-defensive propensities depend on the perceived relative convenience of privately 
buying protection or not, depending on the observed relative return of the two options, which has both 
a material and a psychological component. What we need to understand is which of the two regimes 
fares better, and under what conditions. 
We find that, for parameter values such that both regimes (privately vs. publicly provided protection) 
can be dynamically stable under certain conditions, the public provision equilibrium always strictly 
dominates the private provision one. Moreover, this dominance result can occur even when the private 
provision equilibrium is the only dynamically stable one. The Public Administration's optimal strategy 
is, therefore, trying to reduce self-protective expenses by taxing them, thereby curbing the negative 
psychological escalation. If, however, taxation is uniform independently of the individual level of self-
defence expenses, there is no effect on the social selection of behaviours and there is no incentive for 
self-defendants to switch to the other option. What is needed to change the social dynamics is that 
taxation depends on the actual self-defence expenditure level, thereby discriminating between the two 
classes  of  individuals.  In  this  case,  for  suitable  taxation  schemes,  the  Public  Administration  may 
implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium. This result represents a substantial improvement upon the 
original Cressman et al. (1998) model, where public intervention crowded out private self-protection 
expenses and could not bring about efficient outcomes, and where the only possible outcome of the 
social dynamics was a robust oscillating dynamics (i.e., convergence to a hypercycle). The reason why 
we obtain this result whereas Cressman and co-workers didn't is the presence of the psychological 
escalation factor, which causes the breakdown of the crowding out result. We see this fact as a clear 
illustration of the point that a true understanding of the socio-economic impact of alternative crime 
protection strategies requires a truly interdisciplinary, namely, socio-psycho-economic, approach (see 
e.g. Braithwaite, 2000).  We mean this contribution as a preliminary exploration of the issue, which we 
hope  will  lead  to  further  investigation  and  more  articulated  welfare  analysis  for  more  complex analytical settings. 
The  plan  of  the  rest  of  the  paper  is  the  following.  Section  2  contains  a  relatively  concise 
interdisciplinary review of some of the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 





2    The  socio-psycho-economics  of  defensive  behaviour:  A  few 
insights from the literature 
 
The issue of the choice between public and private policing has a long history, and is subject to 
complex long-term trends (Jones and Newburn, 2002; Zedner, 2006). In the wake of the foundational 
paper of Becker (1968) on the economics of crime, two pioneering contributions to the economic 
analysis of self-defence are those of Bartel (1975) and Clotfelter (1977). Bartel posits the problem of 
whether one should consider public vs. private policing as substitutes or complements, with special 
reference to firms' choices, also investigating the relationships between self-protection and the demand 
for insurance. She finds that firms tend to substitute between private and public policing and that they 
reason in terms of a target level of protection that is most likely achieved by a suitable bundle of public 
and private policing. There was, moreover, no trade-off between private policing and insurance as the 
insurance  rates  are  clearly  affected  by  the  amount  of  security  services  bought.  Clotfelter  directly 
reasons in terms of substitutability between public vs. private policing, and develops an efficiency 
analysis in terms of the relative costs of private vs. public police, arguing that the private side tends to 
become  more  efficient  as  unions  succeed  in  decoupling  wage  increases  for  public  officers  from 
increases in productivity. This may explain the diffusion of private policing in the USA. Likewise, but 
in a more general framework, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) find that market insurance and self-insurance 
(reducing the size of a loss) tend to be substitutes, whereas self-protection (reducing the probability of 
a  loss)  and  market  insurance  may  be  complements.  See  also  Ehrlich  (1996)  for  a  critical  survey. 
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), Briys and Schlesinger (1990) and Jullien et al. (1999) study the effects 
of an increase in risk aversion on self-insurance vs. self-protection, and find that risk aversion typically 
causes an increase of the former but not necessarily of the latter. Lee (1998) considers the case of 
activities that are targeted at ensuring self-insurance and self-protection at the same time (SICP: Self-insurance-cum-protection), and provides sufficient conditions (based on the shape of the loss function) 
for  increases  in  risk  aversion  causing  increases  in  the  demand  for  SICP.  The  results  of  this 
economically motivated stream of literature are pretty intuitive: When potential victims are rational 
decision makers, there is typically a potential trade-off between public and private policing; the most 
likely outcome is a mix between the two, where the actual weights depend on the actual productivity 
and effectiveness of public policing, and, somewhat more subtly, on the risk aversion of potential 
victims. It is then quite possible that crowding out effects may arise in certain circumstances. 
Another,  strictly  complementary  stream  of  literature  focuses  in  more  detail  on  the  strategic 
interdependence between the choices of offenders and potential victims. van Dijk (1994) proposes a 
game-theoretic model where rational offenders and victims strategically interact and set at a Nash 
equilibrium state at which the level of self-protection and the level of criminal activity are fine tuned 
against each other. Zhuang and Bier (2007) study an attacker-defender game where both endogenous 
(e.g. terrorism) and exogenous (e.g. natural disasters) threats may arise, and where the attacker has to 
optimise over a continuous effort scale. In this context, quite complex dynamic effects may arise, 
leading, among other possibilities, to escalation or to setback of attack/self-defence intensity. Hausken 
(2006) focuses on self-protection strategies for firms against cyber attacks, and examines in particular 
the case of interdependent potential victims where both self-protection investments and attacks impact 
on both firms, no matter who is the actual investor/target, showing that in this case there may be 
opportunistic free riding (the more so the higher the level of interdependence) and that offenders will 
tend  to  rationally  allocate  attack  initiatives  across  both  targets.  In  this  scenario,  the  attacker  will 
typically manage to appropriate a larger share of the firms' profits with respect to less interdependent 
contexts. Self-protection will typically increase in the value of the firm asset under attack and in the 
efficiency of the security investment, whereas the propensity of attack is positively influenced by the 
value  of  the  asset  and  negatively  by  the  efficiency  of  the  investment.  Once  again,  very  complex 
dynamic patterns may arise. Bier et al. (2007) study an inverse problem where a defender has to 
protect  multiple  locations,  where  the  attacker  has  to  pick  one.  The  defender's  actual  allocation  is 
observable,  whereas  the  attacker's  preferences  are  not.  There  is,  therefore,  a  classical  problem  of 
negative externalities typical of interdependent self-defence problems: Putting more resources on a 
given location makes the others more exposed to attack. The rather sophisticated rational behaviour of 
the defender is therefore taking advantage of such interdependence by strategically exposing some 
(less valuable) locations to attack and thereby protecting (more valuable) others; this may even entail 
giving up zero-cost opportunities to enhance protection for some locations. The centralized allocation of defensive resources for the defender is superior at equilibrium to the decentralized one, and it is 
advantageous to disclose the defensive strategy rather than concealing it. Muermann and Kunreuther 
(2008) study optimal self-protection strategies of insured players in an interdependent setting with 
positive externalities, where in the absence of an effective coordination device, a somewhat typical 
under-investment result emerges. They also study some welfare improving policies such as publicly 
enforcing a limited insurance coverage to partially internalise the externality (private enforcement 
would be ineffective as competition would lead insurers to offer full coverage): In this case, risk averse 
players would be willing to invest more in self-protection, unless the probability of a loss is large 
enough to discourage self-protection altogether, as originally found out by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). 
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2006) analyse the possibility of public intervention in insurance markets for 
losses from offensive attacks (e.g. terrorism), suggesting that public subsidies can discourage self- 
protection and therefore the negative externalities that go with them, and that have been repeatedly 
discussed above. An interesting aspect of the paper is that it tries to analyse some aspects of the 
psychological  feedback  effects  that  self-protective  choices  may  cause  (such  as  losses  to  national 
prestige  or  impairments  to  the  public  morale).  These  socio-psychological  factors  warrant  stronger 
reactions  from  the  public  administration  with  respect  to  analogous  choices  in  other  (catastrophe) 
insurance markets. Ben-Shahar and Harel (1995) take a somewhat different perspective and propose an 
enforcing scheme that may incentivate potential victims to substitute or complement, according to 
cases, public policing action. Specifically, they make a case for a 'contributory fault' scheme, namely, 
to oblige potential victims to buy the socially optimal level of private self-protection, making them 
liable,  in  the  negative  case,  to  losing  part  of  the  publicly  provided  protection;  even  sanctions  to 
offenders could be linked to the victim's actual self-protection choices and their relationship with the 
socially prescribed level.  
With  the  partial  exception  of  Lakdawalla  and  Zanjani  (2006),  then,  economically  and  game-
theoretically  motivated  studies  tend  to  focus  on  the  design  of  optimal  incentive  structures  to 
countervail the social inefficiencies that arise from the natural externalities in self-protection choices, 
without paying excessive attention to the socio-psychological dimension of such externalities and to 
the feedback effects that they may generate. It is therefore interesting to see what kind of insights 
emerge from the socio-psychologically motivated literature on complementary topics, and in particular 
on the relationship between fear of crime and self-protection choices. Baumer (1979) proposes an early 
account of the main factors explaining fear of crime, among which gender (women definitely worry 
more than men), age (the elderly substantially worry more than the young), whereas other variables such as ethnic groups, income or education are less strongly correlated to fear of crime. There are, 
however, other spatially-related factors that count, such as size of the city and residential location 
within the city, and familiarity with the neighbourhood and with local urban life. Also the level of 
information about criminal activities counts. The three main factors influencing fear of crime seem 
therefore  to  be  vulnerability,  awareness  of  the  incidence  of  criminal  offences,  and  crime-related 
environmental  cues.  Baumer  also  points  out  that  alternative  approaches  can  be  developed,  among 
which  rational choice ones based on the probabilistic reasoning about likelihood of occurrence and 
dangerousness of offences on the basis of environmental factors, personal characteristics and actual 
previous  experience,  or  emotionally  based  ones  that  explain  fear  in  terms  of  response  to  the 
psychological stress deriving by threat assessment and anticipation.  Shortland et al. (1979) showed 
that different types of crimes elicit different emotional responses in a classical target groups such as 
women; in particular, physical assault generates a stronger response than burglary, recurring crimes 
prevail upon occasional ones, and crimes occurring in one's residential neighbourhood prevail upon 
crimes occurring elsewhere. Ziegenhagen and Brosnan (1990) carry out a survey on New York City 
subway riders in high-crime areas finding a substantial diffusion of private self-protection devices 
(weapons),  and  finding  that  the  stronger  predictors  for  the  carrying  of  weapons  were  previous 
victimization  and  fear  of  victimization.  They  also  argue  that  the  degradation  of  the  physical 
environment may be a powerful trigger factor for fear of crime. Silverman and Della-Giustina (2001) 
explain  how  too  aggressive  public  police  protection  strategies  may  actually  feed  fear,  rather  than 
curbing it. Gabriel and Greve (2003) analyse in detail the psychological aspects of fear of crime, 
arguing  about  its  multidimensional  nature,  and  consequently  explore  its  affective,  cognitive,  and 
motivational dimensions: Proper fear of crime calls for beyond-threshold levels of activation of all 
three dimensions at the same time. In particular, this implies that actual self-protective choices cannot 
be  meaningfully  phrased,  understood  and  explained  if  all  of  these  components  are  not  taken  into 
account  and  properly  incorporated  into  the  analytical  framework,  together  with  their  mutual 
interdependencies. Studying individual and social patterns of self-protection without a clear notion of 
the complex feedbacks among the affective (being afraid of the possible offence), cognitive (reasoning 
about the likelihood of the possible offence) and motivational (conditioning one's own behaviour on 
the possibility of the offence) aspects, is likely to produce a serious misrepresentation of the actual 
choice and behavioural scenario, and thus to bias the design of policy strategies. Box et al. (1988) 
provide another multidimensional approach to fear of crime, based on a wide plurality of factors. 
Jackson (2008) examines fear of crime as a marker of perceived vulnerability, and finds a complex pattern of association between the two dimensions. Women are shown to worry more than men, and 
this worry can actually be demonstrated in terms of the incidence of comparatively higher vulnerability 
factors such as less ability for physical defence, and so on. But, at the same time, the young are found 
to worry more often than the elderly (a result that contradicts previous evidence, such as the one cited 
in Baumer, 1979), in spite of the fact that this gap cannot be traced back to comparatively higher 
vulnerability. The key factor seems to be of a cognitive nature, i.e., actual levels of worry seem to be 
linked  to  judgements  of  absolute  and  relative  risk.  Farrall  et  al.  (2000)  present  an  explicit  socio-
psychological model of the fear of crime and show that socio-psychological and socio-demographic 
variables may account for a relatively large component of the overall variance of the phenomenon. 
Warr  and  Ellison  (2000)  further  expand  the  issue  by  observing  that  fear  of  crime  need  not  be 
referenced only to fear of personal damage, but also of damage for others (altruistic fear); such fear 
may even be more intense than personal one and may be deeply structured in family interaction. 
Several self-protective choices might thus be rephrased in terms of altruistic fear.  
Coming to more sociologically-based approaches, Felson and Cohen (1980) argue that the likelihood 
and incidence of direct offences are largely conditioned by the structural dimensions of the social 
organization of work, educational or leisure activities, which create conditions for typical target of 
criminal offences such as women or elderly people to be more exposed to threats, and this can explain, 
for instance, the increase in crime rather in the United States during the 60a and the 70s, namely, in the 
period during which most of these social changes took place more intensively; in this view, crime 
would largely be a by product of socio-economic progress and thus would be largely un-eliminable 
without substantial changes in the social organization of activities, somewhat downplaying the relative 
importance of the issue of self-provided vs. publicly provided protection. Reiss (1986) points attention 
upon the socio-group dynamics of delinquency, and the occurrence of critical social factors that cause, 
at the same time, less social control and higher social incentives to criminal behaviour. Sampson and 
Groves (1989) test a community-level approach to crime based on the Shaw and Mc Kay (1969) theory 
of community disorganization, finding that the major factors causing the latter, such as economic 
poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility and family disruption tend to be strongly associated 
to both criminal offending and victimization in two large British samples. Pantazis (2000) argues that 
fear of crime in contexts characterized by economic poverty is strongly associated to other forms of 
insecurity, and the joint actions of these factor causes a clear perception of a safety gap on their part. 
Gibson et al. (2002) analyse the impact of social integration upon fear of crime in three US cities, 
finding that socially integrated individuals have a stronger perception of collective efficacy in crime prevention and therefore are less prompted to develop self-protection strategies. Moreover, this effects 
tend to prevail on other factors such as socio-demographic characteristics, perceptions of local social 
disorder, and even prior victimization. Rosenbaum (1988) provides a review on the existing evidence 
on  community-based  forms  of  crime  prevention,  finding  a  substantial  lack  of  carefully  designed 
studies that demonstrate how, and under what conditions, such alternative forms of protection may 
emerge as a real alternative to classical forms of publicly and privately provided protection. Clearer 
evidence in this respect is provided by Sampson et al. (1997) and Sampson and Raudenbush (1999)'s 
'collective efficacy' approach. Kennedy (1997) argues that structural social factors that make criminal 
offences recurrent and predictable provide an important opportunity for the design of a systematic 
strategy of crime prevention. The picture that emerges from this literature is therefore that it is the 
underlying social structure that explains criminal behaviour and vulnerability as two sides of the same 
coin, namely, a disrupted - and disruptive - social environment. Consequently, in this perspective self-
protection choices cannot be entirely rationalized as independent, purposeful choices but rather prove 
to be a predictable consequence of the incumbent logic of social relationships. 
However  cursory  and  synthetic,  an  analysis  of  the  sociologically  motivated  literature  thus  clearly 
points toward the structure and characteristics of the social environment as a primary factor for the 
understanding of fear of crime and self-protective behaviours. Riger and Lavrakas (1981) provide an 
early account of how community ties may contribute to building an emotionally based feeling of 
attachment that creates a perception of safety and self-efficacy in residential neighbourhoods. Katzman 
(1980) provides an equally early account of how perception of criminal activity may be an important 
factor of urban decline by selectively disincentivating potential movers - in particular, families with 
children and affluent people, independently of the ethnic group. An economically motivated paper by 
Rizzo (1979), moreover, underlines how one of the major consequences of the fear of crime, and thus 
of its consequences for potential victims, is that it causes changes in property values, and thus urban 
degradation, whose cost is borne mainly by local residents, also in terms of costs of self-protection. 
Ellin (1997, 2001) provides an articulate critical review of the relationship between fear of crime and 
city design in modern and contemporary urbanism, explaining how planners and local communities 
have devised through time alternative, more or less effective strategies of self-protection that have 
deeply affected urban structure and the social logic of urban space use. Davis (1998) provides an 
impressive  account  of  how  the  technological  scanning  of  urban  space  for  protection  purposes  is 
changing the very nature of urban life and experience. In emerging countries, protection and safety 
concerns increasingly often lead to the creation of integrally policed ‘gated’ communities, sorts of ‘civil fortresses’ shielding affluent residents from the threats of often close-by, high crime quarters 
(see e.g. Caldeira, 2001; Rotker, 2002; Landman and Schönteich, 2002). But also highly developed 
countries like the US seem to follow the same trend: Blakely and Snyder (1997) find that, in the mid 
nineties, some 9 millions of US residents lived in gated communities. Since then, figures are more 
likely to have gone up rather than down: For the case of the Phoenix Metro area, Frantz (2001) reports 
that  gated  dwellings  hosted  about  the  12%  of  the  whole  population  of  residents;  for  a  general 
discussion, see also Webster et al. (2002). Loader (2001) and Newburn (2001) argue that the recent 
increase in demand for private policing may be the result of a specific trajectory of socio-cultural 
evolution, namely, the advent of a post-modern consumer culture leading to the commodification of 
security.  Bowles  and  Jayadev  (2006)  have  estimated  that  ‘guard  labour’,  namely,  un-productive 
workers taking part to the surveillance-punishment game on both sides (supervisors, guards, military 
personnel, prisoners, unemployed people), has risen from 6% of the US labour force in 1890 to 26,1% 
in 2002; moreover, there are significant country differences in these figures, and the main driving 
factor behind such disparities seems to be the level of income inequality. 
Although a really systematic interdisciplinary review of all of the above issues would rather be fitting a 
(voluminous) book, even from this concise review it is clear that, considering from a methodologically 
pluralistic perspective the issue of public vs. private protection, and all of its implications in terms of 
fear of crime and related topics, provides an impressive amount of insight and countless suggestions 
for possible formal models exploring a few of the cited factors and mechanisms at a time. It is also 
evident  that  the  gaps  between  disciplinary  approaches  are  large,  and  deep:  For  instance,  the 
sociological literature tends to underplay the role of rational choice in the shaping of self-protection 
decisions,  whereas  the  economic  literature,  on  the  contrary,  pays  little  attention  to  the  incumbent 
structural social conditions. Both appear as serious limitations, in view of the above discussion of 
some of the available evidence. The socio-psychological literature is probably the field where one 
finds more room for the development of an abridged viewpoint that keeps together, at least to some 
extent, the possibility of individual optimising behaviour and the environmental relevance of social 
constructs.  Fear  of  crime  seems  to  be  the  key  factor  in  this  respect,  in  its  inescapably  multi-
dimensional nature that combines psychological, social and economic elements, while at the same 
evolving in complex, challenging ways: For instance, it may be rising even in the face of data that 
prove that criminality rates are going down (this is what has recently happened, for instance, in a high-
crime  urban  setting  such  as  Baltimore;  see  Hermann,  2009).  It  seems  to  be  warranted,  then,  that 
excessively  one-dimensional  approaches  are  giving  away  some  fundamental  aspects  of  the  issue, thereby failing to capture and explain an excessive amount of observed evidence. For this reason, in 
the present paper we try and construct an interdisciplinary motivated model that contemplates the 
possibility that individuals are at least boundedly rational decision makers, while at the same time 
being sensible to the psychological dimension of fear of crime and to imitation-based forms of social 
dynamics driving the cultural selection of behaviours. We will intentionally keep the model as simple 
as possible, interpreting it as a sort of basic theoretical platform to be further developed and articulated 
in future research, as more subtle, multi-dimensional aspects are taken into account and explicitly 
modelled. The contention is that, if the model in its actual stripped-down form is able to deliver a 
realistic enough array of dynamic scenarios and to provide a sound basis for simple policy analysis, 
then  it  can  be  seen  as  a  reasonable  compromise  that  may  hopefully  spark  more  interdisciplinary 





3 The model 
 
Our model is based upon Cressman et al. (1998), who study a two-population evolutionary game: One 
of potential offenders, and the other of potential victims. As already remarked, in this context they 
obtain a crowding out result: Publicly provided protection entirely crowds out private self-protection, 
so that the net effect of public spending on the overall level of protection is null. 
Our model departs from that of Cressman et al. in that, here, interaction takes place through random 
matching  among  three  players:  Two  potential  victims  (‘neighbours’),  a  and  b,  and  a  prospective 
offender,  c.  Self-protective  expenses  by  a  potential  victim  generate  negative  externalities  on  the 
neighbour (as well as on prospetive offenders, of course), in that they cause greater relative exposure to 
offences. This negative effect has a tangible correlative – if a potential victim protects herself by 
buying an armored door, an alarm system, a watchdog etcetera, the offender will attack the neighbour 
provided that he is lacking such protection resources – but also an intangible, psychological one, in 
particular, feelings of fear and insecurity, which may be connected to one’s greater relative exposure, 
but that may also be entirely independent of objective conditions of peril. 
Time is continuous, draws are from continuous populations defined upon the unit interval, and each 
player chooses her strategy without knowing ex ante the choices of other players. In this way, we are able  to  study  the  interdependencies  that  arise  within  the  population  of  potential  victims  as  a 
consequence of the players’ self-protective choices.  
At each instant t, one draw is made, a triple (a, b | c) is randomly matched, and a one-shot stage game is 
played. Potential victims have to choose between two strategies: P (purchasing a self-protection device, 
e.g. an armoured door), and NP (not purchasing any self-protection device). Prospective offenders have 
to choose between R (assaulting a victim) and NR (not assaulting anyone). 
Let us assume that the payoff matrix for the potential victim a (and likewise for b) has the form 
   
 
 
    (1) 
 
where the parameter   denotes the cost of the self-protective strategy. The parameters   and   
denote  the  damage  incurred  in  case  of  assault  for  victims  adopting,  respectively,  the    vs.   
strategy;  we  assume  ,  namely,  those  who  adopt    incur  a  smaller  damage  in  case  of 
assault. We notice that if  , then strategy   does not warrant a full protection (whereas this is the 
case if  ). The parameters   and   measure the damage incurred by the potential victim   
because of the psychological externality generated by the choice of   on the part of the potential 
victim    in  case  a  adopts,  respectively,  strategy    vs.  .  We  assume  ,  namely, 
psychological damage is bigger if player   chooses  .  
In the payoff matrix (1), we have assumed that when both potential victims adopt the same strategy (P 
or NP) the attack may hit any of them with the same (0.5) probability. If instead the two potential 
victims adopt different strategies, then the one that chose not to self-protect is attacked with certainty. 
As to the payoff matrix of prospective offenders, we assume: 
 
 
    (2) 
 
and postulate that:  . The meaning of this condition is pretty obvious; notice, however, that we do not make any assumption on d. The best possible situation for the prospective offender is that none 
of the two potential victims self-protects, whereas the worst possible one is when both potential victims 
self-protect. 
Denoting by x(t) the share of potential victims who self-protect, and by y(t) the share of prospective 
offenders who choose to attack, the expected payoffs from playing P vs. NP are given, respectively, by 
 
    (3) 
    (4) 
 
so that one has: 
 
   
 
For the prospective offenders, expected payoffs under R vs. NR are given, respectively, by 
 
 
    (5) 
    (6) 
 
so that one has 
 
   
 
Since we are working on a (two population) two strategy case, all payoff monotonic dynamics yield the 
same results (Weibull, 1995). For simplicity, and following Cressman et al. (1998), we assume that the 
evolution of x and y is described by the replicator dynamics 
 
 
    (7) 
 
The replicator dynamics can be seen as a relatively simple model of cultural evolution driven by simple 
mechanisms of learning by imitation (see Björnerstedt and Weibull, 1995; Weibull, 1995; Sacco, 1995; 
Schlag, 1998). In particular, it amounts to postulating that players are boundedly rational and update 
their choices through a simple rule of thumb that leads them to adopt the behavior that seems relatively 
more rewarding on the basis of the available observations of others’ behaviors. In the general case, the replicator  dynamics  causes  strategies  to  grow  (decline)  the  more,  the  higher  (lower)  their  payoff 
differential with respect to the population average. With only two strategies, of course, the shares 
dynamics are regulated by their payoff differential; this is also why, in this simple case, the replicator 
dynamics yields the same results as any other payoff monotonic dynamics. The replicator dynamics has 
been widely studied and has nice properties in terms of equilibrium selection (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 
1988),  and  for  these  reasons  has  been  widely  adopted  in  the  applied  evolutionary  game  theoretic 
literature. Our model, therefore, puts together various elements: The interplay between material and 
psychological consequences of criminal and self-protective behaviour; bounded rationality and cultural 
selection mechanisms; and strategic interaction between potential victims as well as between victims 
and prospective offenders. On this basis, we will be able to provide a full characterization of the social 





4  Basic mathematical results 
 
In this section, we present a complete classification of the social dynamics (7). As we shall see, the 
most interesting case is the one where the equilibrium at which all potential victims self-protect is 
Pareto dominated by a no-protection equilibrium. 
 
 
4.1  Fixed points 
 
 
The dynamical system (7) is defined on the square  : 
 
   
 
In what follows, we will denote by   the side of   where  , and by   the side where  . 
Similar interpretations apply to   and  . All sides of this square are invariant; namely, if the pair 
 initially lies on one of the sides, then the whole correspondent trajectory also lies on that side. 
Notice that the states   (the edges of the square) are always fixed points 
of the dynamic system (7). In such states, only one strategy is played in each population. Furthermore, 
it is easy to check that the other fixed points are: The points   and   at the intersection (when 
existing)  between  the  interior  of  the  sides  ,  (at  which  ),  and  the  curve  defined  by  (at which  ); and the point   in the interior of   where the curves   
and   (at which  ) meet, when existing. No fixed point (generically
1) exists along the 
sides  ,  . Thus, the highest number of fixed points that can be generically observed is seven. 
 
 
4.2  Stability of fixed points 
 




Thus, the following proposition can be easily checked. 
 
Proposition 1 : The fixed points  ,    and  , when existing, are saddle points or sources. 
The eigenvalue of   in direction of    is  , and the eigenvalue in direction of   is 
. 
The eigenvalue of   in direction of    is  , and the eigenvalue in direction of   is 
. 
The eigenvalue of   in direction of    is  , and the eigenvalue in direction of   is 
. 
The eigenvalue of   in direction of    is  , and the eigenvalue in direction of 




Notice that at most two fixed points can be simultaneously attractive. In particular, if   (i.e.   
dominates  , that is, prospective offenders will always find it conventient to attack), then only the 
fixed points   (Surrender Scenario: No potential victims self-protect, all offenders attack)  and 
 (All-Round Fight Scenario: All potential victims self-protect, all offenders attack) in the side 
 can be attractive. Specifically, they will be simultaneosly attractive if: 
 
    (8) 
                                                
1In particular, no fixed point exists if    while if   or  , then one of the two edges is point-wise fixed.  
If   (i.e.   dominates  , that is, prospective offenders will never want to attack), then only the 
fixed points  (Peace Scenario: No potential victims self-protect, no prospective offenders attack) 
and  (Deterrence Scenario: All potential victims self-protect, no prospective offenders attack) in 
the side   can be attractive, and they are simultaneously attractive if: 
 
    (9) 
 
If  , then only the fixed points   and   can be attractive, and they are simultaneously 
attractive if: 
 
    (10) 
 
Figures 1-3 show some trajectories of the dynamics (7) in the cases where, respectively, the couples of 
fixed points   and  ,   and  ,   and   are attractive. 
Notice that all fixed points can be simultaneosly sources or saddles. This is the case if: 
 
   
 
In this case, all of the trajectories that start in the interior of Q tend to a limit cycle or, as in Figure 4, to 
the boundary of Q, indefinitely rotating anti-clockwise. This is the ‘typical’ behaviour that emerged in 
the Cressman et al. (1998) model. 
 




















 Figure 1. 
€ 
α > β2 /2 and 
€ 
γ1 < γ2 + β2 −β1 −α; d<a.  Surrender vs. All-Round Fight scenarios. 
 
Figure 2. d>c and 
€ 
γ1 < γ2 −α. Peace vs. Deterrence scenarios. 
 
 
 Figure 3. a<d<c and 
€ 
γ2 −γ1 >α, 
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Figure 4. a<d<c and 
€ 
γ2 −γ1 <α, 
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4.3 Interpretation of the results 
 
The  results  of  section  4.2  are  difficult  to  read  and  to  interpret  in  their  abstract  mathematical 
formulation. In this section, we provide a systematic interpretation and a commentary. 
The social dynamics of the model basically generates three different regimes, one of which further 
divides into two distinct sub-regimes. They are identified by the relative magnitude of the returns of the 
various options for prospective offenders. In particular, they are indexed by the relative position of the 
‘free’ parameter d (the return to not attacking for prospective offenders) with respect to the payoffs for 
the other situations, for which, as noticed above, we have that c>b>a: The return for attacking when no 
potential victim self-protects (c) is higher than the return to attacking when only one potential victim 
self-protects (b), which in turn is higher than the return to attacking when both potential victims self-
protect (a). 
The first regime is identified by the condition  : By giving up attacking, prospective offenders get 
less than they would be getting in the worst possible conditions when attacking, namely, when facing 
all self-protecting potential victims. In this case, offenders will have a strong incentive to attack, and 
this is in fact what they will do. This could be caused by the low return to other illegal activities, or by 
the paucity of alternative legal forms of income, such as unemployment benefits. We thus call this 
regime the No Way Out regime: No matter what happens, offenders will be up for crime. Under these 
conditions, there may be at most two alternative long-run equilibria: The one where potential victims 
give up defending themselves (the Surrender scenario), and the one where they resist (the All Round 
Fight scenario).  If both have to exist, condition (8) must hold: Namely, protection must be relatively 
costly with respect to (expected) damage without protection, but not costly enough to overcome both 
relative physical and psychological damage. If protection is by all means cheap (α<β2/2), then the All 
Round Fight is the sole possibility; if, on the contrary, it is extremely expensive (α>β2-β1 + γ2-γ1), then 
Surrender will emerge. When costs lie in the range prescribed by (8), which equilibrium is reached 
depends on initial conditions, namely, on the initial distribution of behavioral types across the two 
populations, provided that parameters are such that both equilibria exist (see above). If they do exist, 
then, we will end up in the Surrender scenario if the initial share of aggressive offenders is large 
enough, and if the initial share of self-protective victims is small enough. In this case, attacks will be 
relatively frequent, to an extent that even self-protective victims will eventually give up protection in 
that  it  is  not  (cost-)effective  enough  to  shield  them  significantly  against  a  plethora  of  very  active offenders (a result that is somewhat reminescent of Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). On the contrary, when 
in the initial situation most victims self-protect (and attacks are again very common in that attacking is 
so much more convenient for offenders than not doing so), the few ones who don’t are attacked so 
often that they will find it convenient (i.e., cost-effective), to protect themselves as well. Depending on 
what is the ‘traditional’ (i.e. culturally inherited) orientation of potential victims, then, in the No Way 
Our  Regime  we  will  witness  convergence  toward  the  Surrender  or  toward  the  All  Round  Fight 
Scenario. Clearly, the relative amplitude of the two attraction basins depends on the characteristics of 
the payoff structure of the potential victims: For a given initial distribution of shares of behavioral 
types of victims and offenders, the higher the cost of self-protection, the lower the relative demage 
from attack in case of no protection (as compared to the self-protection case), and the lower the relative 
negative externality from the other victim’s choice of self-protection when the victim under exam 
chooses  the  no  protection  option,  the  wider  the  configuration  of  initial  conditions  for  which  the 
Surrender scenario will emerge, and vice versa for the All Round Fight Scenario (Figure 1). 
The second regime corresponds to the condition  : In this case, prospective offenders may always 
obtain from other activities at least as much as they get from attacking in the best possible conditions 
(i.e., facing no self-defense). They could be, for instance, the returns from other, relatively safe illegal 
activities, or even, again, legal sources of income that require some form of constant social monitoring 
that prevents an intense criminal activity (e.g. unemployment benefits conditional upon an intensive 
and  compulsory  lifelong  learning  program).  We  thus  call  this  regime  the  Outside  Option  regime: 
Offenders are lured into other activities than attacking, legal or not. Here, the two possible long-run 
scenarios are Peace or Deterrence. If both have to exist, condition (9) must hold: The cost of self-
protection must be lower than the relative negative externality from not protecting, so that there is at 
least one good reason to protect oneself in spite of the fact that offenders are relatively unwilling to 
attack; the negative feeling deriving from being exposed to damage whereas others aren’t is large 
enough to make self-protection plausible. If, on the contrary, self-protection is relatively expensive 
with respect to the size of the psychological damage, only the Peace scenario will be possible. When 
(9) is met, once again, the eventual equilibrium depends upon the initial distribution of behavioral types 
in the two populations, and upon the characteristics of the payoff structure of victims. As attacking is 
not so rewarding, there will be relatively few offenders around (or at least, the share of offenders will 
decline rather quickly). If most victims do not self-protect, the possibility of being attacked is relatively 
remote, as the risk of attack is spread over a very large number of exposed victims; thus, eventually, no 
one will find it cost-effective to self-protect, and the Peace scenario will result. Conversely, if most victims initially self-protect, even if there are relatively few offenders, not self-protecting causes a 
substantial exposure to attacks, and this eventually leads to choosing the self-protection option even if, 
overall, the number of offenders declines in time. If the cost of protection is relatively low, the relative 
damage from attack without protection is comparatively high and so is the relative negative externality 
from the other victim’s self-protection choice in case of no protection, then the attraction basin of the 
Deterrence scenario will be relatively wide with respect of that of the Peace scenario, and vice versa 
(Figure 2). 
The third, most complex and interesting regime, however, is found when  , i.e., when there is 
no obvious option for offenders. They have to choose whether or not to attack by careful evaluation of 
the  contextual  conditions:  Sometimes  offenders  play  tough,  and  sometimes  not,  depending  on 
circumstances.  Since  the  actual  dynamic  behavior  in  this  regime  basically  depends  on  specific 
parametric conditions, we generally speak of a Critical Regime (in the sense that a suitable parameters 
change may bring about a substantial modification of the dynamic behaviour of the model, for instance 
through a bifurcation). In this case, we have two distinct sub-regimes. In the first, that we call Tug of 
War, the two stable scenarios are Surrender and Deterrence, again according to initial conditions and 
the victims’ payoff structure; it is easy to reconstruct how the relative amplitude of the two attraction 
basins is determined by suitably adapting the arguments for the already discussed cases. However, in 
this case it is not necessarily true that both scenarios are equilibria. This only happens when (10) holds 
(Figure 3). Condition (10) basically requires that the cost of protection is relatively low when compared 
to  the  relative  negative  psychological  externality  from  not  protecting,  and  relatively  high  when 
compared to the (expected) damage when being attacked without protection. In this case, there is a 
tradeoff  between  the  no  protection  and  self-protection  options  that  is  driven  by  the  psychological 
factor: Whereas material conditions would make it relatively reasonable not to protect (damage would 
be not large enough to make protection cost-effective), the psychological impact of being exposed is 
subtantial enough to make protection a viable choice. In this case, what will be the eventual scenario 
that emerges, Surrender or Deterrence, will basically depend on the quite complex interplay of all of 
the parameters of the model, including initial conditions (Figure 3). It should be clear now why we 
speak of Tug of War for this sub-regime: Either victims or offenders conquer the field depending on 
which factors ‘pull’ more strongly in the proper direction. And to further confirm this intuition, we 
have that, if α drops below β2/2 (protection becomes relatively cheap in all respects), we will only have 
the Deterrence scenario as a possible equilibrium, whereas if α climbs above γ2-γ1 (protection becomes 
so expensive to overcome any kind of material or psychological damage), only the Surrender scenario will result. 
The second sub-regime, that we call Rock-Scissors-Paper, is found when the cost of protection is lower 
than the (expected) damage without protection, but higher than the negative psychological externality 
from no protection. In this case, we have a perpetually oscillating behavior, as in the original Cressman 
et al. (1998) model. It is interesting to discuss why in this case we have cyclic behaviour rather than 
convergence to a stable state: After all, as in the Tug or War sub-regime, here too we have a non trivial 
tradeoff between material and psychological costs. How come that the resulting social dynamics are so 
different? The answer lies in the relationship between relative costs and the interaction between the two 
victims.  In  the  Rock-Scissors-Paper  scenario,  material  damage  is  high  and  negative  psychological 
externalities  are  low  given  the  cost  of  protection.  When  the  share  of  the  victims  that  self-protect 
increases,  attack  becomes  less  rewarding  for  offenders  and  their  share  decreases;  but  once  the 
frequency of attack gets diminishing to a significant degree, potential victims begin to disinvest in 
protection, provided that they are relatively less sensitive to the negative psychological externality of 
exposing themselves. But as this dis-investment dynamics generates a massive decrease of protected 
potential  victims,  new  opportunities  for  prospective  offenders  arise  and  they  start  growing  again 
relatively quickly, thus soliciting in turn a defensive response from victims that start investing in self-
protection again, until the cycle is completed and a similar, new one begins (Figure 4). At this point it 
should be clear why we speak of a Rock-Scissors-Paper scenario: like in the famous game (and in its 
corresponding game-theoretic representation; see e.g. Friedman, 1991), there is a cyclic structure that 
prevents  the  equilibrium  distribution  to  settle  on  a  monomorphic  equilibrium.  In  the  Tug  of  War 
Dynamic Regime, instead, when we consider a similar situation, namely, an increasing number of self-
protecting victims, the share of attacking offenders drops as well, but now, given that the sensitivity to 
negative psychological externalities is high and the level of material damage is relatively low  (or 
better,  it  is  cost-effectively  covered  by  protection),  victims  are  aware  that  most  victims  are  self-
protecting and therefore feel the psychological urge to maintain their shield against offenders; thus, 
because of the psychological link (that is to say, actual crimes decrease but fear does not, as in the 
Baltimore episode cited in section 2), the level of protection remains high and the social dynamics 
eventually converge to the Deterrence scenario. 
This key role of the negative psychological externalities deserves further discussion. It can be read in a 
twofold  way:  On  the  one  hand,  such  externalities  are  related  to  the  fear  of  being  relatively  more 
exposed than others to criminal attacks as other increase their level of protection; on the other hand, 
they are related to the consideration that the very fact that others are willing to increase their level of protection  is  evidence  of  a  threatening  social  environment,  and  this  prompts  further  concern  and 
anxiety. In the Cressman et al. (1998) model, the only non-trivial dynamic regime was cyclic behavior 
as in our Rock-Scissors-Paper scenario. Lack of consideration of the psychological externality (fear 
dimension), among other factors, did not allow to obtain the bi-stable Deterrence-Surrender dynamic 
regime that, as we shall see, is the more interesting from the point of view of welfare and policy 
analysis. Considering fear of crime as a possible key force behind the social dynamics, thus, does not 
simply  add  an  extra  element  of  realism  to  the  model,  but  basically  modifies  its  results  and  its 
descriptive and predictive power. On the basis of the previous analytical results, we are now ready to 




5  Welfare and policy analysis 
 
5.1 Welfare analysis 
 
We begin by examining the average well-being of potential victims. The average well-being level is 
given by: 
 
    (11) 
 
With reference to the various dynamic regimes defined in section 4, the following proposition holds. 
 
 
Proposition 2  
In the No Way Out regime (i.e. when  , so that   dominates  ), the fixed point  (the 
Surrender senario)  strictly Pareto-dominates   (the All Round Fight scenario) – that is to say, 
 –  iff    . 
In the Outside Option regime (i.e. when  , so that   dominates  ), the fixed point  (the 
Peace scenario) always strictly Pareto-dominates   (the Deterrence scenario). 
In the Critical Regime (i.e. when  ), the fixed point  (the Surrender scenario) Pareto-
dominates  (the Deterrence scenario)  iff  .  
 
 Using conditions (8)-(10), it is easy to check that, when there exist two attracting fixed points (bi-stable 
regimes), then the fixed point such that   (where all agents play  , i.e. the non self-protected 
equilibrium) always Pareto-dominates the one such that   (where all agents play  , i.e., the self-
protected equilibrium). Moreover, the fixed point such that   may Pareto dominate the one such 
that   even when the latter is the only attractive fixed point for the social dynamics. 
Let us now try to understand better the meaning of the conditions found in Proposition 2. In the No 
Way Out regime, there are three parameters that count for welfare analysis: the cost of protection, the 
damage from attack in the absence of protection, and the psychological negative externality in the case 
of  protection.  In  particular,  it  will  be  Pareto  optimal  for  victims  not  to  self-protect  if  the  cost  of 
protection exceeds the difference between the (expected) damage in the absence of protection, net of 
the psychological negative impact of others’ protective choices when the victim self-protects. We can 
think of the latter quantity as intrinsic fear – that is, the fear that the victim feels even when she has 
done all she could to protect herself. When fear is intrinsic and protection is costly, and overall the two 
quantities  overcome  the  expected  damage  without  protection,  there  is  little  the  victim  can  do  to 
improve her position by self-protecting; as a consequence, giving up protection is the best self-serving 
choice. 
In the Outside Option regime, there is no reason why victims should choose to self-protect, in that 
prospective  offenders  do  not  find  it  convenient  to  attack.  The  only  reason  why  the  Deterrence 
equilibrium may emerge in this scenario is that fear of being exposed by potential victims is strong 
enough to push the social dynamics toward self-protection in spite of the steady decline (and of the 
eventual disappearance) of criminal activity. As to the Critical regime, we find a condition for Pareto 
optimality of non-protection that is similar to the one for the No Way Out scenario, with the difference 
that now it is less restrictive: What is required now is that the cost of protection and the level of 
intrinsic fear be larger than the (expected) incremental damage from attack with lack of protection with 
respect to the damage from attack with protection. Then, unless victims have very much to lose from 
remaining unprotected from the offender attacks, if there is a high level of instrinsic fear and protection 
is relatively costly, it is likely that victims will be better off without self-protecting. 
 
 
5.2 Public security expenses 
 
Given  the  previous  welfare  analysis,  how  can  public  administration  act  in  order  to  implement  an 
optimal allocation? The answer seems pretty clear: It should try to reduce self-protective expenses of potential victims in order to curb psychological negative externalities (i.e., in order to thwart the social 
dynamics of fear). This goal may be reached by taxing victims (and possibly discriminating between 
self-protecting and non self-protecting ones), and using the revenues to provide public security: In 
other words, we are now in the position to study the publicly vs. privately provided protection dilemma 




    (12) 
 
 
    (13) 
 
where   and  , with  , are tax rates, and   captures the effect of the public security 
expenses by the public administration. 
 
We remark that, as p grows, the dynamic regime may shift from No Way Out to Outside Option (going 
through the intermediate Critical regime where no offender strategy is dominant). Therefore, for a high 
enough p, all trajectories of the social dynamics will converge toward the edge of Q such that y=0 (all 
prospective offenders choose not to attack). At this point, the issue becomes that of preventing the fixed 
point  (the Deterrence scenario) from becoming attractive – that is to say, to prevent the 
possibility that victims keep on buying self-protection in spite of the fact that there is no risk of being 
attacked. This latter, Pareto inefficient scenario is indeed quite possible, in that victims could fail to 
understand  that  the  lack  of  attacks  is  not  due  to  their  self-protection  but  to  the  publicly  provided 
security. 
We  moreover  remark  that,  setting  ,  that  is,  taxing  in  a  non-discriminatory  way  both  self-
protecting  and  non-protecting  victims,  public  intervention  does  not  affect  in  any  way  the  payoff 
differential between the two strategies, and thus cannot have an impact on the dynamic properties of 
the  social  dynamics  ,  including  the  possibility  of  preventing  convergence  toward  the  inefficient 
equilibrium with private protection. In order to prevent the Deterrence scenario (the (1,0) fixed point) from becoming attractive, thus, it is necessary to introduce discriminatory taxation, i.e., increasing   
(while keeping  constant). In this way, it becomes possible to shape the social dynamics in order to 
implement the no self-protection optimal equilibrium (the Peace scenario  ) as a globally 
attractive limit equilibrium outcome. 
Clearly, these remarks only tell us that, contrary to the Cressman et al. (1998) model, in our model the 
investment in public security may lead to a Pareto improvement, depending on the actual values of   
and   that are necessary to secure a high enough level of public intervention (a high enough value of 
p). It could be interesting to analyze this aspect of the model as an optimal control problem for the 








In this paper we have shown – on the basis of a simple social dynamics governing the evolution of 
strategic protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of prospective 
offenders in a large population with random matching – that fear of exposure to criminal threats may 
actually condition choices even in the face of objective evidence of declining crime rates, and thereby 
cause the eventual selection of a Pareto inefficient equilibrium with self-protection. We have also 
shown that a suitable strategy of provision of public security financed through discriminatory taxation 
of self-protective expenses may actually overcome this problem and drive the social dynamics toward 
the efficient no protection equilibrium. In our model, then, we do not obtain, as in Cressman et al. 
(1998), a crowding-out result such that the net impact of public spending on the actual social dynamics 
is neutral and the economy keeps on cycling between phases of high and low criminal activity with 
varying levels of self-protection (although stable cycles are possible also in our model for suitable 
parameter  values);  quite  to  the  contrary,  it  can  be  extremely  effective  in  implementing  the  social 
optimum, in that it acts primarily on the intangible dimension, that is, on the social dynamics of fear. It 
is our contention that, in order to discover and understand this subtle socio-psychological mechanisms, 
we need to develop a much more interdisciplinary perspective on the issues of self-protection and on 
the  analysis  of  the  relative  economic  and  social  effects  of  alternative  policies.  This  calls  for  a 
formidable amount of work, in that it is necessary to acquire a profound knowledge of very different 
streams of literature and of alternative methodological approaches, and to become able to combine them in creative and fruitful ways into suitable analytical frameworks. We hope that this will become a 
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